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Abstract—The paper describes the vulnerability of SIP servers to 
DoS attacks and methods for server protection. For each attack, this 
paper describes their impact on a SIP server, evaluation of the threat 
and the way in which they are executed. Attacks are described in 
detail, and a security precaution is made to prevent each of them. The 
proposed solution of the protection is based on a specific topology of 
an intrusion protection systems components consisting of a 
combination of Snort, SnortSam and Iptables applications, the 
solution was verified in experiments. The contribution of this paper 
includes the performed comparison of the DoS attacks’ efficiency  
which were tested both without any protection and then with 
implemented Snort and SnortSam applications as proposed in our 
solution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper deals with one of key issues of IP telephony 
regarding SIP server robustness against attacks and 
compares security risks inherent to various Denial–of–
Service (DoS) attacks and addresses effective protection 
against them. We describe DoS attack types and the 
knowledge is used to test the robustness of the SIP proxy 
server.  
As a result of the ever more widespread implementation of 
VoIP solutions, PSTN networks are likely to be completely 
replaced one day. A frequently implemented solution for 
telephony is a SIP server. Security was not the main goal in 
developing the application; it was actually rather on a sideline. 
Yet, security has become more and more important with its 
increasing popularity. 
     This situation is simplified by similarity of SIP protocol to 
HTTP and SMTP protocols, so potential hacker can use 
existing weakness of these protocols against SIP. One of the 
most used attacks is DoS (denying service completely or just 
particularly). On top of used attacks is because of its high 
efficiency and relatively simple feasibility.  
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For our purpose, we decided to perform all experiments in a 
real used SIP server platform based on an open–source 
solution Asterisk.  
II. CLASSIFICATION OF DOS ATTACKS 
Denial of service can be achieved in several ways – flooding 
a server with malformed, damaged or useless packets as a 
result of which the server runs out of its resource capacity. The 
affected server is then unable to communicate with its regular 
users or process regular requests. 
     Security threats such as DoS almost do not affect the 
previous generation PSTN networks. This is due to their 
closed network topology originally designed to transfer voice 
information [1]. With the rising numbers of VoIP 
implementation, the situation is changing. And the users 
expect the same behavior from the new technology. We can 
divide DoS attacks into three general classes [2], [3]: 
 Flooding attacks – targeting on server resources (CPU, 
memory or link capacity). 
 Misuse attacks – the hacker uses a modified SIP 
message to cancel or redirect calls or misuses the 
service. These attacks typically affect a small group 
of users only. 
 Unintentional attacks – the attacker targets the 
supporting services (DNS, call billing, etc.) in order 
to distort or restrict the service. 
 
The impact of a DoS attack depends on the target. Targeting 
a particular client can lead to denying the service to this user 
only but when a SIP server is the target, no user can use VoIP. 
When a SIP server is attacked, the provider’s reputation also 
suffers. As a result, the provider may lose some of his existing 
and potential customers [4]. 
     In recent years, due to their increasing frequency, impact 
and complexity, DoS attacks became a major issue. But we 
need to distinguish between intentional and unintentional 
attacks [5]. As VoIP solutions have been developing fast, 
many server break–downs are caused by software bugs or bad 
configuration. Unintentional attacks, on the other hand, are for 
example instances of crowd frenzy when a high number of 
users are trying to communicate and the server cannot 
withstand such a high load (natural disasters, holidays, etc.). 
This state obviously passes very quickly, as more and more 
users are served by the server. 
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Fig. 1 DoS attacks classification 
 
 
Identifying the distribution of maliciousness in the IP 
address space we can apply a Hilbert map of malicious activity 
created by Team Cymru which can be seen in Fig. 2 [6].  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Hilbert map of Internet malicious activity created by 
Team Cymru 
 
The map shows the entire Internet address space, each pixel 
representing a block of 4096 IP addresses. Pixel color 
represents level of malicious activity produced by machines 
with IP addresses from the corresponding block, (heatmap 
scheme: black = none, white = highest). The cumulative 
distribution function activity computed for /8 network blocks 
was extracted directly from picture 2  by J. Stanek [7].  
 
Fig. 3 Cumulative distribution function of the aggregate level 
of malicious activity 
 
The distribution function depicted in Fig. 3 helps us in identifying IP 
addresses (or blocks of IP addresses) in /8 network blocks that are 
being used more often in attacks [6], [7]. 
 
A. Memory Depletion Attacks 
When a server accepts a SIP message, it has to store small 
chunks of information. The time for which such information 
chunks are stored depends on the server mode – stateful or 
stateless. While the transaction is being performed, the 
information is kept in memory, and is deleted only once the 
transaction is closed or timed out. The most frequent attack is 
a TCP SYN flood attack. The server is flooded with packets 
with the SYN flag set. The server allocates the necessary 
resources and responds with packets with SYN+ACK flags. 
The attacker keeps on sending new packets with SYN flags, 
and does not respond to packets sent by the server. The server 
then quickly depletes all memory resources for a new TCP 
connection and starts refusing regular requests. 
     Another example of this type of attack is to send highly 
fragmented packets with certain parts intentionally omitted. 
The server attempts to request the missing parts and stores the 
received packets in memory. The useless information is then 
stored on the server until it is timed out. 
 
B. CPU depletion 
Another way to effectively limit the server’s ability to 
process regular requests is CPU depletion. A higher load may 
be caused by a higher number of requests received or by 
receiving requests requiring additional complex calculations. 
The server can become flooded with ICMP packets but 
sending malformed REGISTER messages creates the same 
effect with a significantly smaller number of messages.  
     This is due to the fact that messages are analyzed after the 
server receives them. Even if the server is capable to process 
hundreds of regular messages, it can be easily forced to 
perform different calculations using malformed messages with 
bogus or invalid data or sent from nonexistent user accounts.  
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     Paradoxically, enabled authentication on a server can 
trigger off more challenging operations, which makes it easier 
to deplete CPU resources. When a server uses certificates, the 
attacker may send a message with an invalid certificate. In the 
end, the server discovers that this certificate is invalid but the 
processing of the message had already consumed much of 
server resources. 
 
C. Bandwidth depletion attacks 
This type of attack does not consume resources of the 
physical server but rather the capacity of the link connecting 
the server to the network. When the link is not able to transfer 
regular packets, these are discarded before they can reach the 
SIP server. This is why it is not possible to distinguish between 
regular and malicious packets. Using the UDP protocol to 
transmit SIP messages makes the situation even worst. For 
obvious reasons, attackers use the stateless UDP protocol with 
the maximum packet size. 
 
D. Misuse attacks and attacks on SIP features  
In general, attacks of this type need only a small number of 
packets to achieve DoS. They use the weaknesses of the target 
to their benefit. We can divide these attacks into three 
subgroups: attacks against the operating system, 
implementation of TCP/IP stack and attacks using the SIP 
protocol. Below, we describe the attacks using the SIP 
protocol.  
     This attack attempts to deny the users the access to VoIP, 
i.e. users are the victims of these attacks. This attack does not 
necessarily affect all users. But from the provider’s point of 
view, this attack is much more dangerous than the above 
described attacks. In order to be able to carry out this type of 
attack, the hacker has to be able to capture the network traffic, 
modify SIP messages or to disguise himself as a different user.  
     In the case of BYE attacks, one of the parties is convinced 
that the call was terminated. The attacker uses data captured 
from the SIP headers to create malicious BYE messages. 
CANCEL attacks are similar, except that they affect the calls 
before they are connected. The attacker sends a malicious 
CANCEL message, using the same sequential number as the 
INVITE message. Using the same sequential number causes 
that the malicious message does not have to be authenticated 
provided it arrives before the final answer from the legitimate 
user. The only protection against these attacks is to ensure an 
encrypted transfer of SIP messages. 
 
E. Amplification attack  
This is an instance of a distributed denial–of–service (DDoS) 
attack. The attacker sends packets to broadcast addresses in a 
specific sub–network with a spoofed source address (victim’s 
IP address). The packet is delivered to all hosts in the sub–
network and they respond back to the spoofed address.  
     The attacker does not need to infiltrate other hosts, he only 
uses them. Smurf attack and Fraggle attack are examples of 
this type of DDoS attack. 
 Another type is loop and forks scenarios. Loop scenario is 
based on resending request to the same location (server). The 
SIP specification provides header field named Max-Forwards, 
which work as well as TTL field in IP header. This field 
protects server from an endless looping of requests. 
 Fork attack use N other VoIP servers for amplification of 
attack. Each account is pointing to another account under other 
provider. When no stateful server is used, the overload easily 
consume resources due to message processing.  
III. TECHNOLOGY USED 
There are many possible ways to secure against DoS 
attacks. Due to features, performance and abilities of 
embedded systems; we choose to run the SIP server on this 
device. The server parameters are as follows. 
 Single-core at 2,2 GHz 
 512 MB RAM 
 cca 2 GB HDD 
 
 The protection mechanism should be a part of this solution. 
Attacks against the embedded systems are more dangerous due 
to their relatively lower performance which makes the attacks 
more efficient. We chose an IPS system, consisting of three 
applications. 
 
A. Snort 
The core of the entire IPS solution is IDS system Snort 
which detects malicious activity in the network [8]. The 
detection is based on signatures or detection of anomalies. The 
whole IDS system is modular, consisting of the following 
components: 
 Packet decoder – Captures packets from network 
interfaces, prepare them to pre–processing. 
 Pre–processor – Prepares or modifies packets before 
 the processing (packet defragmentation, URI decoding, 
reassembling TCP streams, . . . ). 
 Detection engine – Responsible for attack detection. 
 Logging and alerting system – Depending on detection 
engine, the packet may be used to log activity or 
generate an alert. 
 Output modules – Or plugins, for adding another 
features.  
 
B. SnortSam 
This application operates on the client–server model. It 
allows Snort to dynamically intervene into IPtables rules. To 
ensure its proper operation, we need to first patch our Snort 
installation with a SnortSam plugin.  
    The client communicates with the Snort’s sensor, sends 
commands to the server (when incident has been detected). 
The server listens on port 898, applying information from 
clients to IPtables rules. SnortSam messages are transferred as 
encrypted, based on preshared passwords which must be same 
on server and on client A whitelist of non–blockable IP 
addresses is also available.  
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     The detected traffic is then blocked for some time. Once the 
attack is over and timed out, the blocked IP is allowed to 
communicate again. Thus, only malicious traffic that poses a 
threat to our server is blocked.   
 
C. IPtables 
An open–source firewall for Linux–based operation systems. 
It is used to block malicious traffic on a server. In our case, 
running at the same physical device as a VoIP server, 
 
D. Solutions limit 
The main limitation of the proposed securit6y mechanisms is 
dependent on the detection with Snort IDS. If there is no 
corresponding signature for detecting the attack, the attack 
cannot be blocked. 
Another important factor is the delay between detection and 
attack blocking. Even if we have appropriate signature of 
attack, the following steps bring further delays (as in Figure 4). 
This delay can lead to a weakening of the entire security 
mechanism. Minimizing this delay is one of the important 
points in building a defensive solution. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 The delay of a defense mechanism 
IV. RESULTS 
We created a testing topology to measure DoS effectiveness 
and for further testing. It consists of SIP proxy server, hacker’s 
PC and some endpoint devices. SIP proxy runs the Asterisk 
application, and the operation system implemented is Linux 
for servers – Ubuntu 10.04 LTS (server edition).  
 
     The malicious tools applied by hackers with the same OS as 
the SIP server are as follows [9]-[12]: 
 Sipp (in repository named as sip–tester) 
 inviteflood 
 udpflood 
 flood2 
 juno  
 hping, fping, nmap 
 
A. Attacks on server CPU using sipp 
The Sipp programme is primarily used to simulate calls and 
to carry out SIP proxy stress tests [13]. The application is an 
open source traffic generator that was designed specifically for 
testing purposes [14]. Sipp is capable of simulation of both 
UAC and UAS and can also generate both signaling and media 
traffic. The original source code of SIPp was written by 
Richard Gayraud and modified by Olivier Jacques, but thanks 
to its rapidly growing popularity, it quickly became a 
community tool and many authors joined its development [7].  
 
At the beginning, the popularity of SIPp came from the fact, 
that it was quite easy to use. The original simple command line 
interface was intuitive and provided all the necessary 
functionality for generation of SIP testing communication. 
During the development, the CLI was additionally extended by 
usage of XML files specifying the SIP communication 
scenarios and these scenarios were extended by the possibility 
of insertion of data from external CSV files. 
Another big advantage of SIPp is that it was (and still is) 
open source, written in C++. Therefore every user can easily 
implement any functionality according to his needs. Many 
patches for SIPp were created, extending its functionality in 
many ways. Thankfully, the maintainers of SIPp did not allow 
the tool to become a multi-branched unmanageable monster 
and restricted the way the patches were being adopted by the 
stable version of SIPp. The patches that did not make it to the 
stable version were made accessible in the project webpage for 
anyone to use or improve. Thanks to that, SIPp remained 
relatively simple and easy to use but there are plenty of 
extensions available [7], [15].  
 
Sipp, with a simple upgrade of the call scenarios, can carry 
out malicious calls on SIP proxy [16]. These calls are intended 
to overload server’s CPU. Figure 5 shows the impact of these 
attacks on the server. The attack scenario applied was the same 
for each attack. Sending malicious packets started in 10 s and 
continued for 60 s. Another 30 s shows the time for which the 
server is still inhibited by the attack.  
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Fig. 5 The impact of different attacks on a server’s CPU load 
 
To enable the comparison of the efficiency of individual 
malicious SIP messages, the messages had been sent to the SIP 
server with the same rate (250 messages per second). For 
instance register flood attack is run by following command: 
 
sipp -sn uac 192.168.0.10:5060 –sf reg_notag.xml -m 100000 
-r 250 -s 1003 
 
Clearly, the most effective SIP messages to attack a SIP 
server are REGISTER and OPTIONS. In the first case, the 
endpoint could not register or make calls, though running calls 
was not affected (the RTP stream only between endpoints). 
Sipp attacking scenario is shown below. 
 
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding="UTF—8”?> 
<scenario name=”SIP DOS REGISTER”> 
  <send> 
    <![CDATA[ 
      REGISTER sip:[service]@192.168.0.10:5060 SIP/2.0 
      Via: SIP/2.0/[transport] [local_ip]:[local_port] 
      From: <sip:[service]@[local_ip]:[local_port]> 
      To: <sip:[service]@[remote_ip]:[remote_port]> 
      Call—ID: [call_id] 
      Cseq: 1 REGISTER 
      Contact: sip: [service]@[local_ip]:[local_port] 
      Max—Forwards: 70 
      Subject: Performance Test 
      Content—Type: application/sdp 
      Content—Length: O 
    ]]> 
  </send> 
</scenario> 
 
Fig. 6  Example of xml attack scenario 
 
Paradoxically was the scenario in Figure 6 one of the most 
effective register attack scenario. It’s because of his simplicity.  
 
When SIP proxy doesn’t have enough information in 
register message, it tries to find or guess missing data. This 
behavior leads to a further increase in computional load 
(regular SIP header is shown in fig.  7). 
 
 
 
REGISTER sip:192.168.0.10 SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.0.3:15068;branch=z9hG4bK-
d8754z-4bbaa5ad277e3c56-1---d8754z-;rport 
Max-Forwards: 70 
Contact: 
<sip:1001@192.168.0.3:15068;rinstance=e7238becce042b76
> 
To: "1001"<sip:1001@192.168.0.10> 
From: "1001"<sip:1001@192.168.0.10>;tag=f4c01cef 
Call-ID: 
NDE5NGI0NTY0ZDk3NDNjNzg0ZGVlN2YyMjNmZmIxO
Dk. 
CSeq: 2 REGISTER 
Expires: 3600 
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, 
REFER, NOTIFY, MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, INFO 
User-Agent: X-Lite 4 release 4.0 stamp 58832 
Authorization: Digest 
username="1001",realm="asterisk",nonce="5935b1a9",uri="si
p:192.168.0.10",response="79c8c8d3c37e2f026a2a7503d958
713a",algorithm=MD5 
Content-Length: 0 
 
Fig. 7: A regular SIP register header 
 
OPTIONS flood caused merely a delay in request 
processing, yet the situation deteriorated as the attack 
continued. In the end, not a single endpoint was able to 
register or make calls. The relatively long time necessary for 
the server to recover (in both cases) was rather surprising.  
     The delay in connection was evident in the attack 
performed by means of INVITE messages. Some calls failed 
to be connected at all. The attack was performed by a non–
existing source user. 
     Attacks performed by means of BYE, CANCEL and ACK 
messages returned almost the same results (the figure 
illustrates only the attack by means of the BYE and CANCEL 
message). 
 
 
Fig. 8  Impact of BYE and CANCEL flood attacks 
 
 During the attack, no call or registration was affected. BYE 
and CANCEL were not sent to end a particular call.  
     Security precautions against all these attacks include Snort 
rules tracking the number of messages sent to the SIP server 
from a particular source address. The blocking rules were 
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similar in most cases, like this Snort rule for blocking 
unwanted register flood. 
 
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> 
$SIP_PROXY $SIP_PORT (msg:"SIP 
DoS attempt(registerflood)"; content:"REGISTER sip"; 
detection_filter:track by_src, count 50, seconds 5; 
classtype:misc-attack; sid:1000001; rev:1; fwsam:src, 
10min;) 
 
Fig. 9 The example of Snort rule. 
 
Where the limit for messages was exceeded, the blocking 
rule was activated on the firewall by snortsam server. ¨ 
The time of blocking malicious traffic was set to 10 
minutes. After this interval is the blocked IP allowed to 
communicate with server. Snortsam automatically extend the 
time of blocking, when the attack is still detected. Whole 
solution than really effective against actual attacks and can 
simply converge to non-blocking state without human 
intervention when the attack ends. 
 
The CPU load with the activated IPS system was about 9% 
during all these attacks (fig. 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: The impact of an attack with (SSI) and without the 
protection. 
 
The attacker could be sending all the above mentioned 
malicious messages at a higher rate. In this way each malicious 
message can consume up to 100% of the server’s CPU. Just to 
compare, the INVITE messages need 10 times higher rate than 
the REGISTER messages to consume a similar load of the 
affected machines CPU. The INVITE messages can also send 
the inviteflood application and create a situation very similar 
to the flooding with UDP packets (the same is true for any 
attack with a high rate of packets sent). Differences between 
applications can be seen in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11  Inviteflood using a variety of applications 
 
B. Link flooding attacks 
Unlike the above mentioned attacks, udpflood only floods 
the target destination with useless UDP packets. These packets 
contain a sequence from 1 to 9, followed by zeros. The packet 
size is 1400 bytes, and the tool can spoof the source address. 
The syntax of udpflood coomand is following: 
 
./udpflood <source_ip> <destination_ip> 
<source_port> <dest_port> <number_of_packets> 
 
 The CPU load is very low during the attack but all 
communication with the server is blocked due to a high 
volume of traffic. This traffic was in tests about 10.9 MB/s, 
which is almost the bandwidth of the fast Ethernet line 
(100Mb/s) between tested computers. Another delay brings 
virtualization of whole testing concept and upper layer 
protocols. 
 Blocking the traffic on server’s interface is useless as the link 
would still be flooded. There is no efficient protection to be 
applied on the server, it is only possible to eliminate the 
impact of such an attack.  
 
C. TCP SYN flood attack  
The last type of attack against SIP proxy tested was to flood 
it with TCP SYN flag set packets. We used flood2 and juno 
applications. The Juno tool is especially dangerous as it can be 
easily upgraded to spoof the source address and ports. 
 
 
Figure 12: The server’s CPU load during TCP/SYN flood attack 
 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTERS IN SIMULATION
Issue 1, Volume 6, 2012 6 DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/90155
  
 
     When the attack was launched, the connection with the 
server was lost almost instantly. Detecting this attack is simple 
but surprisingly useless. Even with an active firewall rule, 
Snort still analyzes the malicious traffic and the server’s CPU 
load approaches 100%, due to small computing power of test 
machine.  
 
D. Assessment of results  
The performed tests clearly indicate that SIP proxy is rather 
vulnerable to DoS attacks. As the server runs on a limited 
physical machine, only very basic protection mechanisms 
against certain DoS attacks can be implemented. 
 
 
TABLE 1: IMPACT OF ATTACKS ON THE SERVER 
 
 
 
 This system consists of the following applications: Snort, 
SnortSam and Iptables. The tests proved that the analysis of 
the server’s traffic does not significantly affect server’s 
performance (except for TCP SYN flood attack). 
 The most dangerous attacks include flooding with 
REGISTER, INVITE and OPTIONS messages, link 
bandwidth depletion using udpflood and TCP SYN flood 
attack. The attacks using malicious ACK, BYE or CANCEL 
messages are harmless at lower rates, with the same impact as 
udpflood at higher rates. No effective protection to be applied 
directly on the server exists against certain attacks. In this 
case, a more secure network topology is the only solution 
(Figure 13). 
     The main change in this topology is the inclusion of a 
demilitarized zone (DMZ). It is located between two firewalls 
(inner and outer). The purpose of this zone is to separate the 
safe inner part from the rather dangerous outer part of the 
network. Both firewalls run SnortSam agents so rules can be 
dynamically applied on both machines. 
 
 
 
 
     Fig. 13: The proposal of a safer topology. 
 
The inner firewall (marked as Firewall 2) serves to protect 
the SIP server against the attacks from inside of the network. 
All traffic to the SIP server has to pass through at least one 
firewall. The safe inner network should be implemented as a 
matter of course. The potential attack from inside of the 
network would affect many users. Using encryption, VoIP 
VLANs and methods such as ARP inspection and DHCP 
snooping should provide an adequate response to possible 
security breaches. The implementation of a QoS mechanism 
should further reinforce the protection.  
     A honeypot located in the DMZ is an inspiration for further 
security precaution to be implemented. 
 Another security measure is the use of encrypted 
transmission of VoIP protocols. But if we do not have full 
support for encryption (both signalization and voice stream) on 
endpoint equipment, encryption cannot be deployed. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
DoS attacks can be carried out in many different ways. We 
tested their efficiency in practice and documented the results. 
This article maps the most frequently used attacks of today and 
evaluates the risk inherent to each of them. The resulting 
solution is an IPS system based on the Snort application. This 
application is combined with two other – SnortSam and 
Attack type VoIP server CPU impact Threat 
Communication 
with VoIP 
server 
REGISTER 
flood 
High CPU 
usage at a small 
rates  
Very high Impossible 
INVITE 
flood 
CPU load based 
on rates 
High Impossible 
ACK,BYE, 
CNL flood Low CPU load Low 
Very limited, 
delayed 
OPTIONS 
flood 
Gradually 
increasing CPU 
load 
Very low Impossible 
UDP flood Low CPU load, line overloaded Very high Impossible 
TCP SYN 
flood 
High CPU load, 
all TCP conn. 
lost 
Very high Impossible 
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Iptables. The disadvantages of this solution include the delay 
between the detection and response (typically where the 
firewall is not on the same physical machine). If the attacker 
eliminates the IDS system, the whole protection system is 
useless. The impact of certain attacks can only be reduced by 
implementing changes to the topology. In this paper, we 
propose to reinforce the topology’s security by introducing a 
demilitarised zone. The argument here is the impact of 
udpflood and a TCP SYN flood attacks. The paper also 
mentions other security precautions which help to enhance the 
server endurance against attacks in general.  
     As a result of attacks, the high computing capacity can be 
significantly reduced. This can be prevented by using parallel 
computing and a link with high capacity (Etherchannel, optical 
cables, . . . ). However, such measures can increase the cost of 
the proposed solution slightly. The solution proposed in this 
article should ensure a basic level of protection suitable for 
small and middle–size offices or detached workplaces 
requiring their own VoIP solution. 
     The contribution of this paper includes the performed 
comparison of the DoS attacks’ efficiency. It was tested both 
without any protection and then with implemented Snort and 
SnortSam applications as proposed in our solution. 
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